TODES STERN: Grace McDonald had inherited a very large sum of money from her husband. She had organized the Bureau when he was still alive, but I believe that he died soon after the Bureau was organized and she had an enormous sum of money available and she said that she wished to give it to a worthwhile cause. She felt that she had no right to this enormous sum for herself. She was very generous and had advanced ideas about society and wanted in some way to make a contribution in this area. Now, the Workers' Health Bureau was founded to meet the vital national need of the unions for health and safety because the health of the workers on the job was a matter of indifference to the employers. Profits were a priority. In this they had the support of local, state, and national governments. It was a laissez-faire world and government preferred to leave regulation of working conditions to the employers.
To make any gains against hazardous working conditions required the power and strength of the whole body of organized labor. First, to recognize the importance of utilizing evidence based on research to force a change in the conditions of work.
The first to recognize [the need] was the Brotherhood of Painters and Allied Crafts. Job accidents among these workers were increasing and serious illnesses from exposures to toxic materials and paints were common.
TODES STERN:
The Bureau was organized as follows. Local unions were requested to join the Bureau at 25 cents per member per month affiliation fee. With these funds, the Bureau agreed to service the union by making studies of conditions on the job. These studies were based on research, on available materials in documents and books, and on advice and consultation with some of the leading occupational hygienists, or industrial hygienists as they were called at that time, in the country. The Bureau had set up a panel of physicians, chemists, public health physicians, and others who were related to the area in which they were operating. Among the people on the panel were Dr. Alice Hamilton of Harvard, and Dr. Yandell Henderson of Yale, Dr. Emory Hayhurst of Ohio State University, and a number of leading chemists who helped with the analysis of toxic materials and other such activities as the Bureau carried on on behalf of the union. Several principles guided the Bureau's efforts to obtain scientific evidence from investigations of health-destroying processes in industry and from medical examinations of workers to provide the facts so the unions might seek improvements through contract negotiations. They would utilize the evidence in stimulating and promoting state and national safety and health legislation and improvements of workmen's compensation laws. And finally, to educate the trade leaders to protect themselves, their personal health as well as threats to life and health on the job. In other words, to exercise control over their working conditions. INTERVIEWER: When you say Bureau, you were located in one place? TODES STERN: We were located in New York City and we had set up offices in which we had a research department and a library with research materials. We tried very hard to stock up with the latest information in every area of occupational and industrial hygiene and occupational diseases and accidents. Then, when the painters all joined by July 1922, the Bureau set up a clinic for the examination of painters who might have lead poisoning or other types of diseases from exposure to toxic materials.
The clinic had special hours and arrangements were made with the unions to send the workers to the clinic at certain hours when the doctors were there. We had an X-ray machine at the clinic and we sent samples of urine and other samples that required laboratory investigation to chemists who were very well known and who were very competent people. We began to accumulate evidence of the threat to health and life of the painters.
INTERVIEWER: Grace McDonald and Harriet Silverman thought up this idea? Did somebody advise them to do it?
TODES STERN: Essentially it was Grace who thought of the idea, but Harriet was a very competent aide and had many ideas also. Before the Bureau was set up, they engaged in interviews with leading people in the country to find out where they could get the cooperation of leading physicians, professionals, who are interested in industrial hygiene. When the Bureau was set up, a panel of physicians was formed as consultants to the Bureau.
INTERVIEWER: What about the [Communist] Party? Were they in the Party?
TODES STERN: No, it was totally independent of the Party. It was 1921, when they organized. There was hardly any party to speak of. The Party was underground practically because it was just a little after the Palmer Raids. There was no contact with the Party whatsoever at this time or at any time for that matter.
The first step was establishment of the trade union health clinic equipped with a laboratory and an X-ray apparatus. The clinic was open to members four evenings a week and on Saturdays. Its staff consisted of a physician, a dentist, a nurse, and a laboratory technician, plus an X-ray operator who was also a physician. During this time, 267 union members received careful physical examinations, urine analyses, blood tests, and dental examinations.
INTERVIEWER: At the expense of their union?
TODES STERN: It was a program of the Bureau for which their union was paying 25 cents per member per month as an affiliation fee to us. Where trade diseases were discovered, treatment was also available. The physical findings were then carefully evaluated by Dr. Hayhurst, who was an expert in diseases caused by dust and poisonous fumes. Dr. Hayhurst reported that of the 267 painters examined, many were suffering to a very considerable extent from the effects of lead and other poisons to which they had been subjected. The majority were young men working and supposedly in good health. Over half of the young men were found to have anemia. Over a third were suffering from hardening of the arteries, a disease of old age. Of the painters examined, 60.3 percent were suffering from various diseases directly due to hazardous working conditions. And 34.9 percent were ill from non-occupational causes. Only 14 men, or 5.2 percent, were in good health.
The conclusions arrived at by the Bureau as a result of this study were that the greatest hazards, [in addition to] the accident risk being twice that of the general population, were the exposure to toxic work materials which undermined health to an alarming degree, especially the health of young workers, and that the exposure shortens the painters' life expectancy by at least 16 years.
Publication of the details of the study by the Bureau and wide distribution among the unions in the industry spurred many in several states to action. In New York, the painters' union decided that one step towards prevention of disease and death was shortening work hours to a five-day, 40-hour work week. The painters argued that less exposure to poisonous dust and fumes and time to rest increased the resistance of the body to disease and made a 40-hour week, two full days of rest, an imperative.
INTERVIEWER: Was there any talk of changing the paint?
TODES STERN: There certainly was. As a matter of fact, here we were up against the power of the lead paint companies who were very powerful in this country because they were part of the chemical industry which was resisting any kind of changes that might be made in the composition of their paints. It involved profits. We carried on quite a campaign. We got out statements for the newspapers and some studies on lead, but without much success. We had to have the support of more powerful constituents than the trade unions represented. They didn't really represent that much power. It required really a tremendous movement of public health people and others who understood it to force the paint manufacturers to give up lead as an ingredient of paint.
INTERVIEWER: The other thing is when did you join? And how did you get in?
TODES STERN: Yes, now, I just want to go on a little bit more about the program and then I'll tell you where I came in.
The painters' agreement signed in 1923 as a result of negotiations between District Council #9 and the Master Painters contained 10 health regulations including the 40-hour, five-day week. It represented the first health agreement negotiated by any labor union in a contract in the painting industry. Although many of the regulations were minor and it had not been possible to ban lead and other poisons from paints, it did prohibit benzol [a coal tar product] and the use of wood alcohol, and it served as a model for other local and state labor organizations.
I came into the Bureau in 1923 for a six-week period before I was married. I gave up my social work job in order to experiment with the idea of entering the labor movement and it was an opportunity for me since I was a very good friend of Harriet Silverman's and she was the one who recommended me to Grace. Grace had interviewed me and found that I would be very good for this type of work. I came in, without telling them that I was going to be married because I didn't want them to feel that I was shortchanging them. But actually what I was trying to do was to find out whether I would fit into a situation of this sort. I found that while it wasn't altogether the kind of thing I had hoped for, still I thought that it was challenging. After six weeks when I notified them that I was going to be married and would not be there for another year, Grace asked me to come back when I returned from Europe. When I returned in 1924, I began to work in a real way.
INTERVIEWER: And it was a paid job?
TODES STERN: It was a paid job, although not as well paid as what I had had before. I felt it was what I wanted to do. Harriet, who had in the meantime been married, had an extra room and invited us to stay with her until we got settled. That sort of strengthened the links between us.
To go back to the Bureau, following the successful negotiations of the New York painters, the Bureau circulated the results widely and prepared educational materials advising workers on how to protect themselves against lead and other poisonous materials. An address by Dr. Alice Hamilton, professor of industrial hygiene at Harvard, at a mass meeting in support of the five-day, 40-hour week demand of the painters in 1923, was also published and had a strong impact among unions. Even in the distant outposts of Australia, the painters union reported they had won a 44-hour week on the strength of the arguments and facts presented by the Bureau. We were beginning to have an impact even across our borders. By 1924, the Bureau could count as members local unions in Connecticut, New Jersey, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, Indiana, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania. Two state federations of labor had affiliated, New Hampshire and Wisconsin, and the International Association of Machinists had endorsed the organization.
The Bureau had forwarded its investigations into exposures in the trade and published facts about the flagrant conditions where mercury poisoning had been seriously undermining the health of the workers. It had exposed the dangers to workers of using spray painting, particularly in the auto industry, and it was preparing reports on occupational hazards among auto mechanics and repairmen, glass bevellers, mirror plate workers, and glaziers. The Bureau's director had represented the painters of Wisconsin at legislative hearings on the spray machine and had prepared a set of regulations for Massachusetts painters to be incorporated in their state code. When I came in, all of these things had already been accomplished and there was a need for organization work outside of New York. It was at this time that they decided that I should be the organizing secretary. Harriet was educational secretary and Grace was executive secretary. That was the way in which the work was divided.
INTERVIEWER: You traveled around?
TODES STERN: It was the beginning of my work as an organizer for the Bureau, which took me not only to New York locals, but all over the country. The Bureau, alarmed by the mounting number of cases of occupational disease for which the workers received no compensation when forced to leave work, called a compensation conference to discuss amendments it would propose to New York law covering occupational diseases. The law compensated only for a few specific diseases caused by industrial conditions. The amendments were designed to expand coverage to poisoning by silicosis, injury to lungs caused by breathing silica dust, chlorine bromide or iodine derivatives of petrol products. Also, benzol, gasoline, benzene and naptha, and infections or inflammations due to oils, dusts, fumes, or gases. These amendments were approved in a persistent campaign by 69 local unions from 37 cities in New York State that endorsed the amendments. The New York State Federation of Labor agreed to introduce them into the next legislation. The amendments however were killed in the 1924 legislature, controlled largely by employers' forces, but they were reintroduced in 1925 by the federation and endorsed by Governor Alfred E. Smith in his inaugural address.
BUILDING A MOVEMENT

INTERVIEWER: Did you at the same time influence any Congress people to pass motions?
TODES STERN: I personally did not, but Grace did a great deal of this kind of thing and so did Harriet. They were really the prime movers in this area. My relationship to the Bureau was primarily through the unions and the workers. They also went to union meetings and were very close to the labor movement. They had contacts with the panels, the consultants to the Bureau, legislative people, and perhaps with labor union leaders. I worked largely with the rank-and-file workers.
In October 1924, after five workers died of poisoning by tetraethyl lead at Standard Oil in New Jersey and 36 others had been hospitalized, the Bureau issued a warning to labor to protect itself against this new industrial poison in gasoline. It urged the unions to call for an immediate investigation of working conditions at Standard Oil and other plants manufacturing the toxic material.
A few months later, six more workers died of the same cause. So great was the public outcry that the Ethyl Gasoline Corporation requested the Bureau of Mines to investigate the danger to the public from exhaust fumes containing the poison. The mines report cleared the companies and left them free to manufacture, distribute, and sell the product. Finally, the U.S. Public Health Service was compelled to call a public hearing at which Grace argued that the mines report did not prove the toxic material to be safe, and that until such time the product should be banned. A government investigating committee reported that it could not sanction continued manufacture of tetraethyl except under strict regulation. Regulations were proposed to state health departments, but a year later only one state reported instituting regulations in a survey by the Bureau. No state had added inspectors to see that precautions were being taken. The employers were once again the victors.
Finding an increase in response to its program, the Bureau called a second annual convention in 1924 to consider a far-reaching program. A trade union advisory council was formed to carry the program to every union in every state. A national campaign was launched to win wide support for better health, safety, and compensation laws, more health clauses in union contracts, and more education to stop the heavy toll of accidents and occupational diseases. By 1925, the Bureau had been endorsed by six state federations of labor, six international unions, the painters, operators, potters, machinists, paper, pulp, and sulfide workers, hatters, and cloth hat and cap makers in more than 75 local unions had affiliated.
INTERVIEWER: How did you get them?
TODES STERN: For most, I addressed the local unions and told them what was happening in relation to the enormous toll in health and in death of workers on the job. The high rate of accidents, the enormous number of industrial diseases, many of which were not yet even known, and the fact that there was very little regulation, and that employers had complete control of the situation so that even when there was such an attempt, employers were in a position to suppress any efforts.
INTERVIEWER: What you'd do is you'd ask a union to call a special meeting that you'd address of the rank and file? Or would you talk to the union leaders?
TODES STERN: What we did mostly was to solicit the unions to call meetings. We would write to them and tell them that we would like to talk with them. Would they be willing to have a speaker? We got very excellent responses because they were terribly interested in this problem and yet felt powerless to do anything. There were many, many requests made. I handled most of that material. The response was excellent and wherever possible, I handled the union meetings and Grace and Harriet filled in when they were not doing other aspects of the work. Then, on top of that, all three of us were involved in the research and writing because there was so much to be done. There were so many studies to be made. There was so much material to get to the unions that they didn't know about, particularly materials that were already documented. We all did a great deal of research and writing in addition to the organizing work. INTERVIEWER: It was theory and practice. TODES STERN: That's right. It was both.
WORKING FOR LEGAL PROTECTIONS
TODES STERN: Now, evidence of a high incidence of silicosis in the stone cutters' trade revealed in studies by the Bureau had not only triggered a campaign for an amendment to the occupational disease law to compensate workers for disability, but also the demand for protective legislation to reduce the hazard of dust caused by the air hammer, which the workers used in the granite quarries and places where they were doing statuary. This situation of course has changed because we don't have any elaborate stone cutters working on buildings anymore. Most of the stone cutters now are confined to quarries. But they were very highly skilled, many of them.
The death rate from tuberculosis had been found to be five times that of the population at large. When the state federation introduced amendments to the occupational disease law in 1925, it was met by a counter-attack by employers. Concentrating on the defeat of the silicosis amendment, the employers introduced a substitute amendment calling for compulsory physical examinations and other restrictions that would have proven a hardship rather than a benefit for workers because they were recognized by labor as a means by which workers could be screened and dismissed from employment. Once again, all of labor's efforts were diverted to defeating the employers' measures, which were passed, and then vetoed by the governor who had earlier endorsed labor's amendment. The insurance companies were also in full cry against a labor bill to establish a state insurance fund. All of labor's bills were defeated.
The result of this campaign led the Bureau to demand a blanket amendment to state laws to cover all occupational diseases. The struggle to gain piecemeal additions to laws where only specific diseases were compensable became a laborious process in which time and energies were expended for few results.
A survey of workmen's compensation laws by the Bureau in 1925 disclosed that only four states had blanket coverage of occupational diseases-California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin. Five other states and two territories, namely Illinois, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota and Ohio, Puerto Rico and Hawaii, provided limited coverage. Thirty-seven states had no laws protecting occupational disease victims. In federal law covering government workers, maritime workers were excluded. We have only recently gotten the Occupational Safety and Health Act [OSH Act] federal law passed in '69. So the federal law is there now and we conceived of it in 1925. It took 45 years before the federal government acted. I think the Bureau had a great deal to do with initiating it. Of course, there were individuals in the country who saw the terrible situation, but they didn't have the power and the clout to do anything about it. We, at least, had an organization and we could publicize our views. Alice Hamilton had also proclaimed it and Emery Hayhurst and others, but we were the first ones who actually made it an issue and the labor movement took it up. Not the whole labor movement. Not even the AF of L [American Federation of Labor] itself, but many state federations and many local unions that were strong or district councils that were strong enough carried our message and used whatever power they had in state legislatures, and you see how slow it was.
INTERVIEWER: You introduced statewide legislation. Did you also try to introduce federal legislation?
TODES STERN: No. No, we never went to the federal government.
INTERVIEWER: Why was that?
TODES STERN: Because we didn't have any power. We didn't have the AF of L behind us. We could only rely on state federations that were affiliated and local unions. In those states where we had some strength, we prodded the state federations and we plied them with materials and we agitated among them and we finally got them to act.
INTERVIEWER: Did you have an overall strategy? Or did you keep changing it?
TODES STERN: Well, our work was so varied, our interests in this field were so large, and we were so small an organization that we did only what we could do. In other words, we knew that the need was great. Fortunately, we had funds through Grace, but we didn't have the power. So, we did what we could. We used influential professionals who were our consultants board wherever we could to push our ideas, but it was hard going. There were only three of us, you know?
INTERVIEWER: Right. You didn't have a long strategy and a short-term strategy?
TODES STERN: No, we rather worked on the basis of what the locals who were affiliated with us needed and demanded, and we were constantly initiating new programs so that we could win other unions. For example, we started investigating the bakers' industry and a great many of the bakers' locals came in. In the machinists' trade, for example, we did have the endorsement of the International Machinists Union, but the local unions were the basis of the funds. I spent many sessions in Newport, Rhode Island, at the government base where the machinists worked, talking, lecturing at their unions, and I got quite a number of affiliations. Newport was a most active local. There were many very active socialists who understood what we were driving at and recognized that it was a very far advanced program for most workers to grasp.
INTERVIEWER: Was the Socialist Party or any other group involved?
TODES STERN: No.
INTERVIEWER: Anyone else take an interest in them?
TODES STERN: No, and we didn't encourage it too much either. We didn't want to-
INTERVIEWER: You discouraged it?
TODES STERN: No, we didn't discourage it, but they showed no interest. We did not want to have a political label because we felt that the only way we could really advance our work was to be quite independent of any groups except the unions themselves, which we wanted very much to embrace, and which we couldn't always do.
In the 1926 legislature, a blanket amendment was introduced by the New York State Federation of Labor along with other bills to improve the compensation law. In every state, a flood of bills by employers had to be fought. Often the insurance companies and even the medical societies joined forces to circumvent such measures as increased pay schedules. In other words, the only reason that employers were willing to accept compensation at all was that they were being so inundated by court actions, which resulted in such large sums of money being paid to individuals that they could afford to have a compensation law because it was less expensive. On the other hand, the Bureau pressed for improvements in the hope that employers would be forced to introduce safety devices and protective measures if the expense for compensation became too high to bear. At this time, the Bureau was deeply involved in studies of conditions in U.S. potteries. The incidence of lead poisoning in potteries was 15 percent, whereas in England the incidence had been reduced by measures forcing the employers to install protective devices and sanitary facilities. It was very important because the workers could bathe quickly after a job. They could sometimes reduce the effect of the poisons. Similarly, in the bakers' trades, the hazards of dust, heat, poor ventilation and gas were being studied and programs of action along with educational material were issued for the membership. At the 1925 convention of the AF of L, Grace came to address the Bureau's findings and recommendations for action on many aspects of safety and health. Membership in the Bureau was by then far broader; 135 labor bodies in 18 states and Canada had affiliated and the AF of L sought to give added strength to the efforts to establish health and safety standards in the nation. However, Grace was not given an opportunity to address the convention, but instead was invited to present a report to the education committee. The AF of L narrowly restricted membership to the skilled crafts and was deeply concerned over its major priority: wages, hours, and basic economic questions. It did not give much attention to the Bureau's program. The education committee replaced the resolution requesting endorsement of our work with a substitute dealing only with health education.
TENSIONS WITH THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR
INTERVIEWER: Was there antagonism in the AF of L?
TODES STERN: There was rivalry and there was a feeling that we were coming in and taking over their authority, and yet they were doing nothing. But they didn't want their authority usurped because even though they did nothing, they wanted their authority to remain. This was the thing which really led to our demise at the end, because they felt we were getting much too strong, much too influential, and having too great an impact on the local unions.
INTERVIEWER: They wanted you under their control?
TODES STERN: No, they didn't want us at all. They didn't want to have this as an aspect of their program. They felt they had enough to do.
INTERVIEWER:
This was a period of dwindling membership.
TODES STERN:
Exactly, but they didn't care. They felt they had enough to do with just maintaining whatever contracts they could. Sometimes they didn't even want to do that. They were a fat cat kind of bureaucracy that lived on the workers and cared very little. Only occasionally would you find conscientious labor leaders. But on the whole, this was the type, especially in the top leadership of the AF of L. They were not interested in allowing any outsiders to come in and dominate the ideas, theories, and practices in the AF of L. This is what they feared. It was a rivalry. It was a feeling that we might suggest something they would not be willing to do and it would take hold, and then the membership would be aroused and they would have problems.
INTERVIEWER:
Were there any opposition groups within the AF of L?
TODES STERN:
The rank-and-file committees had not yet been organized and, as you say, there was a falling off of membership. They were having a hard enough time keeping themselves together.
INTERVIEWER: So there was no particular group at that time in the labor movement?
TODES STERN: No. They respected the statements made by members of our panel. They liked Dr. Hamilton, but they didn't want to be bothered. They were lazy, unwilling to take any initiative. They were not organizing the unorganized. They were not doing very much for their own membership.
INTERVIEWER: Also, unwilling to confront the bosses.
TODES STERN: Correct. They were very often making deals with the bosses so they would have no troubles. In other words, they were peace-keeping. Now, back to the AFL Education Committee-it replaced the resolution requesting endorsement of the Bureau's work with a substitute dealing only with health education. The convention referred it to the federation's permanent committee on education. The chairman of the committee declared that they recognized the good work which the Bureau had done but withheld endorsement on the grounds that the Bureau was a privately conducted body ignoring entirely the affiliations which were the Bureau's prime support and the fact that it was governed by an advisory council of trade union representatives.
The ideas of the Bureau and its supporters were far in advance of the time. The situation in the country was not yet ripe for acceptance of these ideas. They remained dormant for 45 years before the underlying concepts of health control on a national scale in all industrial and trade establishments were to be embodied in the Occupational Safety and Health Act.
PURSUING THE COURSE
TODES STERN:
Notwithstanding this blow to their hopes for national support, the Bureau pursued its course. During the many strikes in 1925, it offered support to workers in their struggles to organize and to gain decent wages and working hours. During the miners' strike in 1925, President John L. Lewis requested material on mine safety conditions. The results of the studies were submitted to him, but since no gain was made in wages or reduction of work hours, it was hardly to be expected that health safeguards would be considered. For the furriers who were also on strike, health facts were prepared to support their demand for a 40-hour week. They contained an analysis of the hazards of the industry, the results of medical examinations, and recommendations for regulations to control the hazards.
During the great Passaic strike of textile workers in 1926 who were battling for a union, the Bureau undertook medical examinations of more than 400 workers. The program was planned under the supervision of Dr. Hamilton and funded by the American Fund for Public Service. An emergency staff-six physicians, three nurses, two laboratory technicians, and two X-ray specialistswas organized and in 11 days the strikers were given thorough physical examinations, including X-rays and laboratory tests. A report on the health hazards of dyeing and finishing textiles showed that of 404 workers examined, there was an abnormally high rate of tuberculosis. Six out of every 100 had a respiratory ailment. The incidence was highest among the young workers, 14 to 19 years old. Constant exposure to poisons, heat, [and] steam, denial of elementary sanitary and hygiene conditions, low wages, and a work week averaging 59 hours, with many working as long as 72 hours, were taking a terrible toll. The sweat shops in which they worked could only be described as relics of early factory production. In the case of 77 dyers among those examined, not a single worker was found to be in good health. One-third of them had heart disease, high blood pressure, or both. Three dye workers had active tuberculosis and had to be hospitalized immediately. Seven more had severe respiratory disturbances. Eight out of 10 examined complained of severe irritations of eyes, nose, and throat. And over one-third were suffering from rheumatism or muscular pains. Dye workers had a higher percentage of high blood pressure than painters, a higher percentage of heart disease than painters, furriers, or bakers, and a higher percentage of tuberculosis and other respiratory diseases than printers, food handlers, or furriers.
INTERVIEWER: You never thought of going through the court system at all? Suing the companies for health? TODES STERN: No. That never arose at all. It was mostly what the unions would be willing to do. We were really an arm, a tool, of the unions. That's what we wanted to be and nothing more.
INTERVIEWER: Did you want to strengthen unions?
TODES STERN: We helped them in their organization and in their strikes, but only with the facts about their conditions. This was our particular service.
During this period, I was traveling a great deal all over the country. I don't remember the states, but almost as far as the West Coast. I was in Colorado. I was in Tennessee. Colorado was probably the farthest west I got. But everywhere, whenever there was a call, I was always there.
INTERVIEWER: You traveled by train? It took a while? Where did you stay?
TODES STERN: At hotels, mostly. Usually they were overnight stops. They were not long visits because first of all I wanted to get back and secondly, the expense involved was such that the Bureau couldn't afford me to stay. When I came to a union where there was to be a speech made by me, I would get there just about on time and leave almost directly afterwards.
INTERVIEWER: They didn't put you up with union people?
TODES STERN: No. No. No. I never had that experience. I was always quite separate and apart from them. Particularly when I addressed state federations of labor. My experience was always that of coming in, saying I'm from the Workers' Health Bureau, and when am I scheduled to speak? Then, making my speech.
Accidents from unguarded machinery and injuries from acids and other materials were also unusually high. After a long and bitter strike, the dye workers and other textile workers organized a union to enable them to obtain some measure of protection they needed.
By the end of 1926, 180 labor organizations in 18 trades and 23 states had joined the Bureau and workmen's compensation campaigns were under way in Rhode Island and Missouri. In Missouri, where there was no law forcing employers to pay compensation for injuries incurred on the job, the Bureau proposed a comprehensive bill, including a blanket clause covering all occupational disease.
In its report to the second annual meeting of the Trade Union Advisory Council in May 1926, the directors of the Bureau noted that their services had been extended to 17 trades, and that from 1925 to 1926, auto workers, federal employees, lithographers, moving picture operators, garage workers, garment workers, printers and molders had joined from California, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, the District of Columbia, from Michigan, Minnesota, and Texas. The number of labor bodies that had affiliated since the Bureau's founding five years earlier was four. Eleven labor bodies had been affiliated for four years, 16 for three years, and 48 for two years. The remaining 81 had affiliated during 1925 to '26, which showed that our organizing campaign was bearing fruit.
The Bureau had the support of three international unions, four state federations, four central bodies, nine state conferences, and two building trades councils. The report to the advisory council also noted that a standard set of health regulations had been won, not only in New York, but in Rochester and Schenectady, New York, and Kenosha, Wisconsin. State codes had been prepared for the Massachusetts and New Jersey state conferences, and for the Syracuse painters. They included arguments for the prohibition of spray painting. After an address by Grace, the convention of the International Brotherhood of Painters voted to affiliate and a health program was drawn up and submitted to their executive board. A call to all unions was then sent out by the Bureau, urging health agreements in all negotiations with employers, which would include substitution of safe for dangerous paint materials, the 40-hour week, the prohibition of spray painting, the labeling of paint materials, compensation for all occupational diseases, and the establishment of cooperative medical clinics.
Then, seven unions of the Brotherhood requested aid in obtaining health agreements. As a result of this campaign, Schenectady painters reported they'd been able to prohibit spray painting in both inside and outside work. The bevellers of New York obtained a general health clause in their agreement and painters in Everett, Washington, in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and in Grand Rapids, Michigan, reported progress. In Massachusetts and New Jersey, where the painters had presented a code of health regulations, the state industrial commissions, influenced by employers' pressures, adopted a few minor recommendations, but refused to ban spray painting. See, that's where the employers were more powerful.
INTERVIEWER: And there was very little you could do about the employers? Did you ever talk about attacking the employers directly, like writing in newspapers about the employers, or what was going on? Did you try the press?
TODES STERN: I recall that in 1927 Grace went to the Soviet Union and obtained a formula for the hatters of Danbury, Connecticut, who were very, very widely affected by mercury poisoning, and there was a high percentage of illness and deaths. And the illness usually made them incapable of continuing work. This formula, which she found, for felt hats, for reducing the fur, was non-mercurial. And she brought it back with the idea that we would publicize it and force the employers who prepared the chemicals for making felt hats to change their methods and use a non-mercurial type of chemical. The unions were very enthusiastic about it and tried very hard to get this formula accepted, but the employers were absolutely adamant. It went right up to the most powerful employers in the country, the chemical industry itself. And we could not get any results. Here we had a formula that had been used in the Soviet Union and was found to be absolutely competent and capable of producing what they were after, and would have safeguarded the health of these people, and they could not succeed.
INTERVIEWER: Did the locals think of organizing around these issues?
TODES STERN: Well, they did. The trade union movement itself was not strong enough to do anything. And they had so many other priorities.
THE TIMES WERE NOT YET READY TO ACCEPT OUR IDEAS
INTERVIEWER: And so much unemployment.
TODES STERN:
And so much unemployment. It was a very difficult time, and as we have said before. . . .
INTERVIEWER:
It's almost the wrong time to do it.
TODES STERN:
We were in advance of our time and the times were not yet ready to accept our ideas. Everything was against us in a way. But whatever we did accomplish, I think, was simply extraordinary, considering everything. It was our energy and determination and we had so many setbacks and yet we never gave up. We kept on going. The three of us worked very, very hard.
INTERVIEWER: And there was no discrimination because you were women doing this work?
TODES STERN: We didn't feel that very much. There might have been, for instance, in the construction industries, where there were all men. They might have been skeptical about us from the beginning, but once they saw what we were doing, and once they got our materials, our materials were really very, very damaging to the employers. We mustered our facts in such a brilliant way, and our pamphlets were so readable and so understandable, and everything was documented, so that we didn't make claims that were not factual, that could not be corroborated by the evidence and documents. This in itself gave us quite a good handle to even those unions that were not very friendly to women. The machinists, for instance, were a totally male population, and they accepted us very readily, I think perhaps because they were a more advanced type of skilled worker than, let's say, the construction workers. Advanced in their thinking.
Other studies made during this period [included] a survey of hazards in the mirror-making industry. It was at 10 mirror-making plants in New York. Chemical analyses of 21 samples of various work materials and 25 samples of air were made. Twenty recommendations were submitted for negotiation and included exhaust ventilation to be installed for the control of dust, prohibition of certain materials, lighting, guarding of machinery, sanitary requirements, and first aid. A survey of shop conditions in the stonecutting industry in New York and New Jersey, 15 recommendations were submitted to the unions for negotiation-guarding of machinery, removal of fumes and dust, sanitary facilities, first aid, and provisions for compensation for all injuries. For the bakers, hatters, and garage workers, special forms were worked out to record shop and personal health data. They were to be returned for study. Shop complaint forms analyzed for 30 bake shops in Connecticut revealed that 21 had serious violations of the law, while 20 had flagrant conditions not covered under the law. Following a conference of bakers' locals in New York and Connecticut, a health program was worked out, which, among others, called for regular reporting of violations to the health and labor departments. A standard set of health regulations was presented for negotiations with employers. Similar actions were taken for the hatters where shops were in serious violation of the law and for the garage workers. For the postal workers, the Bureau prepared a report on the medical examinations of 1,085 postal employers made by the Life Extension Institute of New York and the U.S. Public Health Service that were used in a national campaign to reduce their hours of work.
On the legislative front, the Bureau could report a publicity and educational campaign for the affiliated bakers' locals of Wisconsin to win prohibition of night work and the introduction of a bill to gain such legislation in the state. The Northwest Painters requested assistance in formulating a bill for a clean wallpaper law. Research material was submitted showing the states that had such laws and their provisions. For Indiana painters, the Bureau sent arguments for prohibition of spray painting for a city ordinance, and a copy of a model ordinance, together with educational leaflets.
Having achieved considerable organizational strength and a record of accomplishment, despite lack of support from the AF of L and strong opposition by employers to labor's efforts where health and safety were concerned, the Bureau called its third convention in January 1927. Forty-two delegates from six trades and seven states were present. Grace could report in her speech to the convention that the Bureau now had the support of one-half million workers in 181 affiliated labor unions. She reviewed the developments during the five years of activity and assessed the achievements. She noted that a large proportion of the Bureau's resources had been thrown into the painting industry, and that it was justifiable since the painters constituted a major portion of the affiliated bodies of the Bureau. She made a plea for intensified efforts to obtain regulations prohibiting the use of lead, benzol, wood alcohol, and other toxic materials, but indicated it involved a fight to the finish with powerful paint manufacturers allied with the gasoline, automobile, and railway industries and representing some of the largest financial groups in the country. She urged efforts to control hazardous conditions by better legislative regulation, better enforcement of existing laws, and for more and improved compensation laws when workers are injured or suffer illness from working conditions.
INTERVIEWER: The thing wasn't to organize the workers directly against this, that really, the workers should get interested in it and make it happen-
TODES STERN: Well, how could we? How could we be organizers of labor?
We could only be organizers in the sense that we would give them the tools to do the organization.
INTERVIEWER: But you could suggest that.
TODES STERN: Well, we did. In our speeches, you see. Not so much in our published material because our published material was related solely to the problems of health and safety, but in our speeches, we agitated them to go and fight. We urged them to take direct action. We told them that if necessary, they ought to strike for this. We were always very militant in our speeches, and very much activists in the sense that we gave them certain directions and ideas for direct action. But it was a difficult time. It was on the verge of the big Depression.
The delegates to the convention were made aware of the problems confronting the Bureau if it was to pursue its activities. As the only organization in the field, it had to demonstrate its value to the unions. Once having done this, it required certain facilities, laboratories, technicians, and above all, finances, to educate and arouse labor. After five years, the Bureau was still unable to obtain sufficient funds to carry on its work. Substantial assistance had been given by the American Fund for Public Service. The initial funding had been obtained through loans from interested persons. An auditor's report had shown that loans had been repaid and the Bureau now had a surplus of $7,336.
The convention adopted a constitution which, in turn, provided for a board of directors to give the widest possible representation to affiliated groups, an executive committee, and also opened the membership to individuals. It issued a call to a national labor health conference for the purpose of planning methods and means of preventing accidents and occupational diseases in all trades in all parts of the country.
THIRD ANNUAL NATIONAL LABOR HEALTH CONFERENCE
The national labor health conference opened in Cleveland in June 1927; 96 delegates from 25 trades and 11 states were present. It was labor's response to an earlier national conference dominated by employers, which disclosed that 35,000 workers had been killed in industrial accidents, and 2.5 million are maimed from these injuries annually. The disclosures, however, had not moved the conference to take measures to prevent the sacrifice of workers' health and lives.
INTERVIEWER: So, who organized this conference? Not the Workers' Health Bureau?
TODES STERN: This was a national labor health conference organized by the Workers' Health Bureau. After hearing reports by the directors and organizing secretary of the Bureau, the national labor health conference endorsed a broad national plan for the protection of labor's health and called for the appointment of standing committees in each trade to cooperate with the Bureau in drafting standards for legislation, and for inclusion as health clauses in trade union agreements. Included in the recommendations were a tentative set of regulations for building construction, which could be used in guidelines for a national building code, a program for national health and safety regulations for coal mines, the control of dangerous and unguarded machinery in industry and of industrial poisons, and Workman's Compensation for railway workers who were injured or killed on the job. The conference discussions and resolutions were later incorporated in a report which was published in pamphlet form and sent to all delegates and affiliates.
THE LAST PROJECTS
TODES STERN:
At an executive committee meeting in October 1927, the Bureau reported on standards and studies which were in process of preparation. To obtain expert advice on the standard building code, the Bureau engaged the services of a representative of the New York chapter of the American Institute of Architects. This action was paid for jointly by the Bureau and the Institute of Architects and met by a special gift to the Bureau. The safety code had been sent to the trade union committee for approval, following which the work on the safety code would be completed by June 1928. A representative of the building trades department of the AF of L was invited to cooperate by appointing a member to the trade union committee. The matter was referred by them to the AF of L, and nothing further was heard. Over one million workers were organized in the building trades of the AF of L, and the toll of deaths each year was 2,000, one-fifth among workers under 24 years of age. No national safety code had ever been formulated or adopted for these workers.
A code was also being drawn for workers in garages and automobile repair shops. The industry was largely unorganized and no state or city regulations existed for these workers, although they faced danger of asphyxiation from automobile gas exhaust during their day's work. A seven-day week and night work was common, and often as much as 84 hours constituted a work week. The subcommittee on standards for these workers had been appointed at the national labor health conference. The committee, including a representative of the machinists' international, was reviewing the code as formulated by the Bureau. When completed, it was to be published in a machinists' journal and serve as the official standard for health and safety in these shops. In preparation also was a set of regulations governing spray painting and the painting and refinishing of automobiles. An explosion in an automobile factory in which 21 workers were burned to death and many others permanently injured had occurred because of the concentration of paint fumes sprayed under high pressure. Although the national safety councils spray coating committee had demonstrated beyond a doubt that spray painting increased the hazards of lead, benzol, and silica poisoning, the machines had continued to be used. The machines had continued to be used with safeguards. The first standards for this industry were drafted by the Bureau.
Arrangements with the New York City Health Department for the examination of 100 members of the United Automobile, Aircraft, and Vehicle Workers Union were then made. Chemical analyses of 10 samples of materials used in spraying in a New York shop showed the presence of benzol. Floor sweepings contained dangerous amounts of lead dust. Results of the Bureau's investigation showed a high degree of respiratory diseases and a far higher incidence of pharyngitis among these workers than among painters in 1923. Based on the medical examinations, a report was drawn up for the union recommending prohibition of the use of lead, benzol, and wood alcohol, and the prohibition of spray painting, unless provided with artificial ventilation powerful enough to carry off all fumes. No positive assurance even then could be given against poisoning.
The union presented these recommendations to the New York State Department of Labor, which was planning to introduce standards for the industry. A joint advisory committee of the department agreed through bureau pressure to appoint a member of the union of the state conference of painters and one of the Bureau technical advisors, Professor C. E. A. Winslow of Yale.
Another project of the Bureau was related to the campaign of the Danbury hatters to abolish the use of nitrate and mercury on felt hats, which had taken such a toll of illness and death from its members. The Bureau had secured the aforementioned harmless substitute formula from Soviet Russia. With the cooperation of the union, the Bureau had arranged with its chemist to experiment on fur skins to find a satisfactory substitute solution and to try out the non-mercury formula. The union was apprised of this and took action to present it to the employers, but nothing came of it. They were not able to put through a non-mercury formula for the manufacture of felt hats.
The completion of union standards of health protection and safety in mines and the textile industry and on railroads was dependent on the cooperation of the international unions, but they were not ready to cooperate. Although the Brotherhood of Painters had affiliated with the Bureau and had endorsed a plan for a national health standard for the industry (and it had been complied with by the Bureau by preparing a broad program, setting forth the required safeguards for every section of the industry), the international [union], after a long delay, wrote that it had decided to discontinue affiliation, for it had been unable to see benefits from it.
LABOR WITHDRAWS SUPPORT
INTERVIEWER: Do you think there were any other reasons?
TODES STERN: There must have been AF of L pressure because they were really very much behind us all along. And we helped all the local unions and had helped them also. And they were friendly to us. There was no question about it, but the pressures began to mount that an international union should not be associated with us. It was an international union, which is the direct affiliate of the AF of L.
INTERVIEWER: Well, why shouldn't they?
TODES STERN: The AF of L itself was putting pressure on them because the AF of L did not want us to play such an important role in the industry. And it was obvious that we had already helped to get a five-day, 40-hour week by the materials we had presented on health, and then, this would put the international union in our debt, and evidently, they didn't want that. In New Jersey, after three years of work on their behalf, the union in negotiations had granted concessions that set a dangerous precedent. Among them were acceptance of the employers' argument that minimum amounts of lead, benzol, and wood alcohol are safe. As a result of the Bureau's stand against these concessions and the policy of the international [union] , the New Jersey painters withdrew their support. Nevertheless, the Bureau continued to provide services for the painters that were rewarding. District Council #28 faced an injunction against their ban on the use of a spray gun, obtained from the Bureau the results of chemical analyses of paints used, and won their case against the employers. In Ohio, 402 compensation claims for occupational diseases were analyzed for the Ohio state conference, and cases of lead poisoning were found to constitute 71 percent of the claims of workers exposed to poisons where spray painting was allowed, along with systems of artificial ventilation. Other findings confirmed the Bureau's position on spray painting. The Chicago district council affiliated after a brief prepared by the Bureau on spray painting, and stopped its use in a government operation.
Even in government operations, they were able to get results because they had the facts. They had all the facts about the dangers to health.
After these experiences, the Bureau concluded that since labor is usually outvoted on committees formed by city or state labor departments by employers' interests, and that even when, as in New Jersey, pressure by the Bureau had succeeded in gaining a 50-50 committee, the employers could win by the vote of the chairman cast in their favor in almost every instance. And since joint committees appointed by the state labor departments are only advisory, the decision rests with the department of labor or the legislature to put recommendations of the joint committees into effect, [and thus] the possibility of successful legislation is slight. In the absence of a labor party, practically no labor representation in any of the legislatures, labor legislation becomes a political football in the two major parties. Third, a policy of trade union officials exemplified by the action in Ohio, to introduce labor legislation only when previously accepted by the employers, will never gain adequate protection for labor. Unless workers are organized in the political field, they have little to gain from efforts in the legislative field. Time is largely wasted when state departments of labor have no power to regulate, and committees appointed by these departments have less than majority representation by labor. Consequently, labor must depend on its own organized strength. Despite this pessimistic outlook for future work, the Bureau nevertheless determined to follow up the interest created at the national labor health conference by a campaign to obtain support in the Northwest.
INTERVIEWER: This was because you were moving to the Northwest?
TODES STERN: That's right. It was because I was going to be able to make contacts directly because of living in the Northwest. It wasn't a bureau. I was simply the organizer for the Bureau in New York City, but we were concentrating on the Northwest. Frequent articles in the labor press there and the fact that unions sent two delegates to the Cleveland conference and that affiliations from Washington, Oregon, and California had been increasing, prompted the Bureau to send its organizing secretary to these areas not visited since 1924. Many unions were visited, and support of the central labor council of Seattle, and 15 affiliations, were obtained. At the AF of L convention that year in Los Angeles, the executive committee of the AF of L reported on three recommendations related to health: that the AF of L celebrate child health day, [work towards] better cooperation with the United States Public Health Service's investigations into the effects of the air hammer on stonecutters (since the trouble lies in controlling the dust from the hammer, rather than the hammer itself), and . . . support coordination of health agencies within governmental departments. In other words, the AF of L was wiping its hands clean of anything that the Bureau had suggested. Even in the case of the air hammer, which we thought was dangerous in itself.
No action was taken regarding prevention and control of occupational diseases, nor was legislation proposed in the field of safety and health. The Northwestern campaign, while successful in making many contacts and obtaining affiliations, did not solve the financial difficulties which the Bureau confronted. It was especially notable that the building trades unions, while expressing interest in the Bureau's building code, were almost unanimously reluctant to join the organization. Many unions were unable to affiliate because their funds were devoted to aiding strikers, and in the Los Angeles area, the unionists pleaded lack of funds because of expenses incurred during the AF of L convention. Shortly after the national labor health conference, the Ohio federation withdrew its membership on the grounds that the Bureau was usurping the work of the AF of L. This is what I indicated before. At the Connecticut federation of labor meeting, the executive secretary was informed that instructions had been received from AF of L headquarters to defeat affiliation. In New Jersey, the state federation voted to cooperate but not affiliate. This was followed by similar action in Wisconsin and California. Idaho joined as a fraternal member for the sum of $10.
INTERVIEWER: So they could just get the information and not have all members pay the 25-cent dues?
TODES STERN: No, it had nothing to do with the locals. The locals were independent of the state federations, but affiliation of a state federation actually gave us access to every local of every trade in a given state. And if they were not affiliated, then it was more difficult to get to them. It was sort of an endorsement that we could use, and now they were beginning to disaffiliate or not affiliate under the pressure of the AF of L.
INTERVIEWER: Why do you think that the AF of L started mounting the pressure? Was it because of success?
TODES STERN: Yes. Because we were doing so well, and we were getting so much further ahead, and we were becoming a force within the unions, and they were afraid.
Other withdrawals were reducing the Bureau's income and ability to operate as effectively as before. The Bureau then sought an interview with President Green of the AF of L, which was refused. Failing in this, arrangements were made to see John T. Frye of the metal trades department and a member of the federation's permanent committee on education. It was to this committee that the Bureau's resolution had been referred in 1925. There was very little hope that anything would come out of that. Presenting the Bureau's problems, namely that it had given useful services without corresponding support from the unions, the Bureau's representatives, instructed by the executive committee, were meeting with the AF of L with a view to working on a basis of cooperation of support. So this Frye responded that he appreciated fully the value of the Bureau, which was fulfilling an important need, but he felt that government bureaus should be made to serve labor, as they now serve the employers.
He conceded, however, that until such time as the government would be doing the work of a bureau, it would be unfortunate for the organization to go out of existence, and that labor should have its own check on employers' bodies. Those who knew Frye knew that he was one of the most reactionary [anti-leftist] members of the hierarchy of the AF of L, and that he was saying this because it would look good in print. He agreed to see President Green with a view to bringing the matter before the AF of L executive committee, and to advise the Bureau in a few weeks as to results. After waiting for two months for the reply, which failed to come, the Bureau announced that it could no longer operate without going heavily into debt. The main financial support had come from the American Fund for Public Service, which had contributed more than $20,800 over the seven years. More than $54,000 was received from private contributions [primarily Burnham McDonald's funds].
Since the intent at the outset was to ask organized labor to assume full responsibility after the Bureau's services had proved useful, failure of the AF of L to act on the question and the subtle pressures on the labor bodies not to grant support, were making it impossible for the Bureau to continue its work. The entire burden was now falling on the small percentage of local unions who were assessing their members for work which was beneficial to the entire labor movement. In reports to the executive committee in April 1928, the [Bureau's] administrative staff stated that it [had] gradually reduced its expenses and would plan to fulfill obligations it had already undertaken. The campaign for new affiliations had been discontinued, and by February 1928, the Bureau was operating on a skeleton staff. It recommended closing by July 1. Funds received from fixtures and from the Bureau's library were used to return unexpired affiliation fees to the unions. All reports and files of the work of the Bureau, as well as educational material, codes, research material were turned over to the Labor Research Association. And I am sorry to say that the Labor Research Association, in clearing out its files because of inadequate space, gave much of our material to an organization known as the IWO [International Worker's Order], which, because of government pressure, became defunct, and the materials have disappeared. In its final statement, the Bureau thanked the unions that had supported and cooperated with the Bureau, and looked forward to the time when a strong united labor movement would be in a position to continue the work which the Bureau had pioneered. We were an idea that was premature, that had not come of age.
INTERVIEWER: And did any of the three of you follow up on this kind of work afterwards?
meeting. Invariably, one of us would go and talk over with them, with these people, what kinds of studies they wanted us to make, what their situation was. We even investigated their shops. We would go through their shops when we made a visit to them, you see, to see what the problems were, and bring back notes and discuss them. We had planning sessions a great deal.
INTERVIEWER: The three of you made all decisions as equals?
TODES STERN: Well, I should think so, except on finances, I had very little to do with finances, and I think Harriet had also very little to do with finances. Because of the situation, Grace handled all the finances.
INTERVIEWER: But were there disagreements among the three of you on policy?
TODES STERN: Well, there were always disagreements, and especially between Grace and Harriet, because Grace was a more cautious kind of person and had a very clear idea of how fast she could go. Harriet was a more flamboyant type and was easily outraged about situations and sometimes wanted to move faster and with more militancy than Grace, so that there were always differences as to how far you could go.
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